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THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LABOR
ARBITRATION IN ARGENTINA
MAXIMO DANIEL MONZON* AND JUAN MANUEL SALAS**
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor law in Argentina has been fashioned in accordance with
the country's historical and cultural framework. These laws have
been shaped by the changing political climate and made seemingly
without any rational purpose. Legislation evolved out of the eco-
nomic context in which labor disputes occur, originally enacted for
the purpose of guaranteeing certain rights to workers as individu-
als and neglecting the advent of organized labor. The regulation of
labor unions is a legislative morass shaped according to the politi-
cal situation of the country.
The legislature, more than the judiciary and organized labor,
has been the main protagonist in the labor law. An active labor
movement, highly dependent on the State for labor benefits, has
continuously called for legislation. Labor unions have played
prominent political, social, and economic roles in Argentina. These
roles result from the high number of unionized workers, the con-
comitant political power of labor unions, the unions' complex or-
ganization, and the unions' potential for causing social turmoil.
In Argentina, congressional legislation has granted most bene-
fits to workers. However, the executive branch has often usurped
the legislative role as a result of numerous coups d'6tat, which
form Argentina's background of political instability. The suspen-
sion of the collective bargaining process in 1975, not reestablished
until January 1988, only served to increase the active role of the
State. Although technological changes have rendered many collec-
tive bargaining agreements obsolete, these agreements continue to
provide the most significant framework for labor negotiations.
During the past few decades there has been a noticeable trend
toward the deregulation of collective labor relationships in which
the parties to these relationships act with increased autonomy. The
* Member of the Buenos Aires Bar Association.
** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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transition from legislative regulation towards a system of self-gov-
ernance is a phenomenon shaping modern industrial relationships.
The trend toward deregulation started in industrialized countries,
but this trend in theory and in practice has gradually impacted
developing countries.
This noted change has greatly influenced the approach of la-
bor unions towards labor conflicts. The traditional confrontational
attitude of labor unions towards management is a cultural and so-
cial phenomenon, not necessarily an economic and legal necessity.
The aggressive approach of labor unions toward the government
and employers has gradually decreased and a new approach, in
which workers are regarded as consumers, has begun to take place.
In light of this new perspective, a more innovative approach to an-
alyzing labor conflicts, and their most serious consequence, the
strike, must be taken. The trend has resulted in a period of transi-
tion from a labor culture centered on conflict toward one centered
on compromise. This change has also influenced methods of dis-
pute resolution, which are now characterized by compromise and
reasonable demands by workers.
Traditional definitions of "collective labor disputes" are no
longer satisfactory inasmuch as they are based on a formalistic
view of labor law and ignore the existence of a "living law." This
"living law" is comprised of rules established by labor unions, em-
ployers, and organizations of employers, which coexist with the
"formal law" enacted by the legislature. The complexity of this
system of self-regulation is proportional to the industrial develop-
ment and prevailing cultural standards which vary from country to
country and from era to era. Just like any other conflict regulated
by law, labor disputes originate with the need to satisfy material
claims. Most labor disputes commence with the filing of a petition
seek_ng modification or alteration of a pre-existing status, or re-
questing remuneration or indemnification. The claim may be ac-
cepted by the employer or it may be rejected by the assertion of a
counterclaim. In the latter case, the dispute becomes less formal
and is likely to trigger "measures of force" (medidas de fuerza).
Thus, the dispute may continue for a prolonged period of time
during which the different methods of dispute resolution may come
into play.
In Argentine labor law, individual labor disputes and minor
collective labor disputes are settled through informal mechanisms.
The informality of these methods of dispute resolution has re-
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sulted in a scarcity of legal research on the subject. Although the
informal practices for dispute resolution developed by labor unions
and employers are not a new phenomenon, their form is defined
only enough to provide fair and effective solutions to labor con-
flicts. Between March 1976 and November 1983, informal mecha-
nisms of dispute resolution increased in importance because the
military government suppressed the activities of labor unions. Law
No. 14.250 of 1953,' which permitted the collective bargaining pro-
cess to operate freely, was suspended in 1976 by Law No. 21.307.2
The suspension of the collective bargaining process and the active
role assumed by the executive branch in fixing salaries made the
operation of informal mechanisms of dispute resolution extremely
difficult.
Even after the formation of the constitutional government in
1983, the executive branch continued to have a prominent role in
the determination of salaries, which prior to 1976, had been fixed
through free negotiations. Finally, the constitutional government
enacted Law No. 23.546 of 1988,3 which reestablished in Argentina
the collective bargaining process after almost thirteen years of in-
terruption. This enactment has been widely perceived as one of the
most auspicious developments in Argentine labor law.
At the present time, Law No. 14.250,' as amended by Laws
23.545,' 23.544,' and 23.543, provides the legal framework for the
collective bargaining process now extended to employees in the
public sector. As a result of Argentina's ratification of Convention
No. 154 of the International Labor Organization (I.L.O.), 7 a bill
was sent to Congress establishing the collective bargaining process
for the public sector, including employees of the legislative and ju-
dicial branches of government. The broad scope of this collective
bargaining process is unprecedented in Argentina.
Individual labor disputes and collective labor disputes are ad-
dressed through two completely different processes. Individual la-
bor disputes in Argentina are settled at three different levels. The
first is through direct negotiations between the enterprise and the
1. Ley 14.250, XIII-A A.D.L.A. 195 (Oct. 20, 1953).
2. Ley 21.307, art. 7 XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1089, at 1090 (May 7, 1976).
3. Ley 23.546, No. 2 at 5, Bol. Inf. 2/88 A.D.L.A. (Jan. 11, 1988).
4. Ley 14.250, supra note 1.
5. Ley 23.545, No. 2, at 4 Bol. Inf. 2/88 A.D.L.A. (Jan. 11, 1988).
6. Ley 23.544, No. 2, at 1 Bol. Inf. 2/88 A.D.L.A. (Jan. 11, 1988).
7. Convention Concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, June 19, 1981, Inter-
national Labor Organization (I.L.O.) No. 154.
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employees. If these negotiations fail, it is customary for the labor
union to report the individual dispute to the Ministry of Labor.
The Ministry of Labor assumes an active role in a proceeding
which is a mixture of conciliation and mediation, seeking an ar-
rangement to end the dispute. If both attempts at reaching a set-
tlement fail, or if none of the two previous methods are pursued by
the worker, the Ministry may resort to the courts of law.
Collective labor disputes of a legal nature (conflictos colectivos
de derecho) seek the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement already in force. The "collective labor disputes of an ec-
onomic nature" (conflictos colectivos econ6micos o de intereses)
seek to modify the rules embodied in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, to substitute for it totally or partially by another agreement
or to convert it into a collective bargaining agreement. Collective
labor disputes are not dealt with at the three different levels indi-
cated for individual labor disputes, but rather according to three
different procedures, with different laws regulating each procedure.
This diversity of laws and procedures results in confusion and the
eventual ineffectiveness of collective methods of dispute resolution.
Law No. 14.2508 and Law No. 23.5469 presently regulate the
collective bargaining process. These statutes respectively provide
for "negotiating committees" (comisiones negociadoras) and for
"bipartisan committees" (comisiones paritarias) in which the par-
ties are represented. The negotiating committees are empowered to
conclude or renew collective bargaining agreements, whereas the
bipartisan committee is set up to interpret the agreements at the
request of the parties or the labor administration. The decisions
rendered by the bipartisan committees have the same normative
force as collective bargaining agreements executed or modified by
the negotiating committees.
Law No. 14.786 of 195910 regulates mandatory conciliation and
voluntary arbitration for collective labor disputes of an economic
nature. This statute also establishes conciliation proceedings for
collective disputes of a legal nature as a preliminary and optional
proceeding before the intervention of the bipartisan commissions.
Conciliation proceedings do not preclude the use of other methods
of dispute resolution. Experience has shown that a multiplicity of
8. Ley 14.250, supra note 1.
9. Ley 23.546, supro note 3.
10. Ley 14.786, XVIII-A A.D.L.A. 319 (Jan. 9, 1959).
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procedures is not conducive to the quick settlement of collective
labor conflicts. Finally, Law No. 16.936 of 196611 provides that the
Ministry of Labor may intervene in the settlement of legal or eco-
nomic labor disputes through mandatory arbitration.
The procedures established in these statutes are inconsistent
and contradictory. The informal procedures that may be freely
pursued by the parties cannot be reconciled with those imposed by
the law. Voluntary conciliation and arbitration are incompatible
with compulsory conciliation. Furthermore, the rules provided in
Laws 14.25012 and 14.786"S are superfluous; labor disputes of a le-
gal nature are generally settled outside the framework provided by
law because the parties prefer to bypass these procedures and re-
quest the assistance of the courts of law.
II. CONCILIATION
In individual labor disputes, conciliation is meant to operate
at the request, invitation or suggestion of a court. In practice, how-
ever, the judge becomes an active participant in the deliberations
and in the arrangement which the parties eventually reach. Indi-
vidual labor disputes may also be brought before the Ministry of
Labor, whose intervention as a mediator promotes the conciliation
of the parties. The arrangement resulting from the conciliation
proceedings is valid only if a court declares that the terms of the
agreement fairly protect the interests of both parties.
Labor legislation also provides for conciliation proceedings in
collective labor disputes, especially if those disputes are economic.
The parties may choose to pursue an informal conciliation proce-
dure not regulated by law, in which they negotiate directly without
being subject to the rules of law. Only in such a situation does the
conciliation of collective labor disputes of an economic nature cor-
respond to the theoretical model provided by law. If the parties
cannot deal with each other at arms length, then the Ministry of
Labor conducts the conciliation process.
The conciliation process, as used in the context of collective
labor disputes, is replete with ambiguities. Conciliation is viewed
as a method of dispute resolution, as a function undertaken by the
11. Ley 16.936, XXVI-B A.D.L.A. 791 (Aug. 31, 1966).
12. Ley 14.250, supra note 1.
13. Ley 14.786, supra note 10.
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labor administration and performed by the public officer who acts
as a conciliator, and as a decision reached by the active involve-
ment of the parties. In contrast, in arbitration a third party settles
the dispute, achieving the goal through coercive methods.
The general perception in Argentina, is that the government
must provide for all aspects concerning the economic organization
of the country. Conciliation of collective labor disputes, particu-
larly economic ones, is therefore left in the hands of skilled officers
of the Ministry of Labor. Although theoretically conciliation seeks
to "cool," and, if possible, "freeze" the dispute, in practice, concili-
ation proceedings are adversary processes which result in a "win-
ner-takes-all" outcome.
The Ministry of Labor is not limited to promoting agreement
between the parties, instead it assumes an active role in the negoti-
ations. An officer of the labor administration usually makes pro-
posals to the parties and attempts to persuade them regarding the
fairness of such proposals. Thus, the "conciliatory" role of the
Ministry of Labor is particularly complex, for it involves the draft-
ing of the amicable settlement, taking measures aimed at furnish-
ing the parties with the information that they need, and supervis-
ing the activities of the parties. The multiple tasks performed by
the labor administration demonstrate how conciliation is more im-
portant than simply mediating the dispute.
Law No. 14.786"4 provides the mechanics of conciliation for ec-
onomic or legal labor disputes and authorizes the Ministry of La-
bor to participate in collective economic disputes. This statute con-
fers on the labor department the power to regulate and direct the
activities of the parties, as well as to take measures and make deci-
sions on its own motion in light of the particular facts of each case.
No strike can begin and no measure of force may be used without
first exhausting this conciliatory stage. Thus, the parties to a col-
lective labor dispute of an economic nature must first report the
conflict to the Ministry of Labor. As of that time, the parties be-
come engaged in a conciliatory process. During that period, work-
ers are prohibited from working in any form. In practice, however,
the steps required by law are not observed. In collective labor dis-
putes, particularly those in which wage increases are sought, the
conflict usually continues for a considerable time without the em-




The Ministry of Labor is authorized to summon the parties to
appear at a hearing, conduct fact-finding on claims and counter-
claims raised by the parties, request the opinion of governmental
agencies and private institutions, and secure any evidence that is
relevant and conducive to a fair settlement of the dispute. If the
parties fail to reach an agreement, the labor administration must
take the initiative and submit a conciliation proposal to the par-
ties. These proceedings cannot be extended for more than twenty
days.
The law generally refers to measures of force or "measures of
direct action" (medidos de accibn directa) as those measures alter-
ing the working conditions which existed before the conflict arose.
If measures of force are resorted to during the conciliation stage,
the Ministry of Labor may issue an injunction and order the par-
ties to reestablish the situation that existed before the dispute
arose. If the parties insist on using measures of force, the employer
is subject to fines and the employees may be sanctioned by not
receiving wages as long as they persist in taking measures of force.
The conciliation proceedings terminate at the end of twenty
days. If, at that point, the parties refuse to submit the dispute to
arbitration, they are left to their own bargaining positions. They
may carry out the measures of force that they deem most appropri-
ate. If the parties are unable to reach an amicable settlement, they
may resort to the procedure provided in Law No. 14.2505 and re-
quest the bipartisan commission to construe the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.
III. ARBITRATION LAWS
The codes of civil and commercial procedure adopted by each
province provide for arbitration as a method of dispute resolution
available to the parties before litigation has commenced or during
the pendency of a suit. The codes of procedure also provide for an
informal type of arbitration, the amiable composition or equitable
arbitration (arbitraje de equidad). The amiables compositeurs are
not subject to the rules of law and render their judgment according
to their knowledge and understanding. The procedural law in labor
matters which is in force in the federal district governs arbitral
proceedings in individual labor disputes, whereas Laws No.
15. Ley 14.250, supra note 1.
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14.78611 and 16.936'7 create complex procedures of voluntary and
compulsory arbitration in economic or legal collective labor dis-
putes.
Arbitration, regardless of its form, is rarely resorted to in
countries whose legal culture relies heavily on the State to settle
disputes. The arbitration system provided for in the Code of Civil
Procedure is not used by lawyers and those subject to the indus-
trial relationships. Similarly, the informal or equitable arbitration,
or amiable composition, is discussed in the writings of legal com-
mentators but rarely used in practice.
IV. ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTES
Law No. 18.345 of 1969,18 as amended, intends to govern labor
procedure for individual labor disputes in the federal district.
However, in practice, this statute provides for a set of rules which
are ill-suited for its purpose. These rules provide for a conciliation
hearing at the outset of the arbitral proceedings. If the parties are
unable to reach an amicable settlement, the court must recom-
mend to the parties that they refer the case to arbitration.
Only the judge or the clerk of the court may serve as arbitra-
tor. Once the deed of submission has been executed, the arbitral
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules for the
amiable composition. The arbitral award may be set aside only if
rendered after the prescribed period has expired or if the award
decides issues which were not submitted to arbitration. The arbi-
tral procedure set forth in Law No. 18.34511 has not become a part
of the daily practice of judges or lawyers. In other words, while
arbitration is part of the Argentine corpus juris, it is not fre-
quently used in the every day practice of law.
V. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION OF COLLECTIVE LABOR DISPUTES
Law No. 14.7862" provides that if the parties fail to reach an
amicable settlement during the conciliation proceedings described
above, the officer of the Ministry of Labor, acting as mediator,
16. Ley 14.786, supra note 10.
17. Ley 16.936, supra note 11.
18. Ley 18.345, XXIX-C A.D.L.A. 2664 (Sept. 12,1969).
19. Id.
20. Ley 14.786, supra note 10.
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must invite the parties to refer an economic collective labor dis-
pute to arbitration. Thus, voluntary arbitration is triggered only
after the failure of the conciliation proceedings. Voluntary arbitra-
tion is only available for economic collective labor disputes and
cannot be used to settle legal conflicts. In contrast, compulsory ar-
bitration, regulated by Law No. 16.936,21 applies to both types of
collective labor disputes.
If the proposal to submit the case to arbitration is accepted,
the parties must enter into a submission agreement (compromiso
arbitral). The submission must identify the parties, the issues to
be submitted to arbitration, the evidence to be produced and the
period within which it must be produced, as well as the time limit
for the rendering of the award. The failure to include this informa-
tion renders the submission null and void.
Voluntary arbitration proceedings under Law No. 14.786 are
of a contractual nature-the parties provide for their own rules of
procedure and agree on the appointment of arbitrators of their
choice. In the few cases of voluntary arbitration of collective labor
disputes that are known in Argentina, the arbitrators have always
been officers of the Ministry of Labor. Thus, it is generally ac-
cepted that the arbitrators must be members of the Ministry of
Labor. This attitude reflects not only a lack of experience with ar-
bitration, but also a legal culture that emphasizes the participation
of the State in the settlement of disputes.
The arbitral submission becomes effective as of the date the
arbitrators accept their appointment. At that time, the arbitrators
have jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings and to render the
award. The arbitrators may carry out a fact-finding process and
order the production of evidence on their own motion. The time
limit to render the award is automatically postponed if the arbitra-
tors decide that additional evidence must be produced. The arbi-
tral award must comply with the same requirements as a judgment
rendered by a court. The award must identify the parties, re-
produce the terms of the submission to arbitrate, and must be sup-
ported by reasons. The award must be rendered within ten work-
ing days after the execution of the arbitral submission. This period
may be postponed if the arbitral tribunal requests the production
of evidence and such evidence requires a longer period to procure.
The arbitral award shall remain in force for a period of at least six




The award may be set aside if rendered after the time limit
has expired or if the arbitration decides issues not submitted to
arbitration. The effects of the arbitral award are the same as the
effects of a collective bargaining agreement and are extended to all
workers and employers similarly situated. In order to be valid, the
award must be confirmed by the Ministry of Labor.
VI. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF COLLECTIVE LABOR DISPUTES
Law No. 16.936 of 1966,22 as amended by Law No. 20.638 of
1974,23 introduced compulsory arbitration in Argentina; however,
legal commentators agree that forcing arbitration on the parties is
not compatible with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Law No. 16.936 authorizes the Ministry of Labor to settle all eco-
nomic or legal collective labor disputes. The decision of the Minis-
try of Labor that a specific dispute must be subject to arbitration
is final. That is, the law unconstitutionally provides that this ad-
ministrative decision is not subject to judicial review.
A collective labor dispute which is subject to compulsory arbi-
tration does not allow for the possibility of measures of force.
Thus, the law provides that within the twenty-four hours of the
administrative ruling by which the case must be referred to arbi-
tration, the parties must cease taking any measure of force. The
parties are notified of this ruling in person or by telegram.
If any party refuses to give up measures of force, sanctions
may be imposed. Employers may be fined in proportion to the
number of workers involved in the dispute. Furthermore, workers
may also consider themselves discharged without cause and enti-
tled to compensation. If the employees fail to comply with the ad-
ministrative ruling ordering the cessation of a strike, the employer
may discharge them without cause. The Ministry of Labor may or-
der the parties to reestablish the working conditions that existed
before the conflict, but there are no provisions for sanctions in case
the parties decide not to comply with the order.
As soon as the labor administration decides that a collective
dispute should be submitted to compulsory arbitration, the arbi-
tral proceedings must commence with the appointment of an of-
22. Id.
23. Ley 20.638, XXXIV-A A.D.L.A. 136 (Jan. 21, 1974).
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ficer of the Ministry of Labor to serve as arbitrator. The law also
provides that the parties may appoint any person familiar with the
economic and legal issues. However, in the few cases of compulsory
arbitration which have taken place, the parties have chosen an of-
ficer of the labor administration to serve as arbitrator. Within
five working days, the arbitrator must summon the parties to sub-
mit evidence which may consist of documents, reports, and expert
opinions. The arbitrator must determine the terms of reference
which dictate the scope of the arbitral award. The arbitrator may
propose, on his or her own motion, that relevant evidence be sub-
mitted by the parties. The admissibility of the evidence is left to
the discretion of the arbitrator.
The award must be rendered within ten working days, but this
period may be extended if the arbitrator orders that additional evi-
dence be produced. The award may be set aside on the grounds
that it was rendered beyond the time limit authorized in the sub-
mission or if it decided issues not submitted to arbitration. In the
federal district, an application for setting aside an arbitral award,
must be filed with the National Court of Appeals on Labor Mat-
ters. In the rest of the country, the application must be filed with
the federal circuit courts of appeals. If the award is set aside, a new
arbitrator shall be appointed and the arbitral proceedings must
commence de novo. This legal framework irrationally encourages
prolonging a dispute for at least two months or more.
The effects of the award vary, depending on whether it deals
with economic or legal labor disputes. Arbitral awards deciding ec-
onomic disputes have the same effects as collective bargaining
agreements and remain in force for at least one year. Arbitral
awards deciding issues of law may be reviewed at any time by the
courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Compulsory arbitration of collective labor disputes has rarely
been used in Argentina. In those few instances where it has taken
place, it has been during de facto governments, thus reflecting the
impact of the political climate on the practice of labor dispute
1989]
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resolution. Although compulsory arbitration has never been re-
sorted to during periods of constitutional government, such as the
one in place since 1983, perhaps it is time to put arbitration to
better and more frequent use.
